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14 July 1970

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
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
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
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Cambodia: Current Situation



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Cambodia: Fighting continues in the Kirirom area.

Phnom Penh has lost radio communication with the government battalion defending the resort town southwest of the Cambodian capital, and some unconfirmed press reports claim that the town has been abandoned to the Communists. Two battalions of Khmer Krom reinforcements, which were reported to be making slow progress through the dense jungle southwest of Kirirom, encountered enemy elements some three miles from the center of the town. According to fragmentary reports, the Khmer Krom, supported by South Vietnamese gunships, inflicted heavy losses on the Communists.

In the only other significant action, Communist forces penetrated government defenses at the Lovek ordnance depot in Kompong Chhnang Province. Counter-attacking government troops apparently were able to push the enemy out of the depot, however. Some stocks of munitions reportedly are still stored at Lovek, but most have been moved to Phnom Penh for safekeeping.

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NOTES

USSR: A decision was taken at yesterday's central committee plenum to hold the long-overdue 24th Party Congress in March 1971. The leadership previously had committed itself to holding the congress in 1970, a commitment reiterated by party chief Brezhnev as recently as 2 July. Difficulties in working out the over-all guidelines for the next five-year plan and other unresolved problems probably account for the last minute decision to postpone the congress. The plenum also announced that Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin would give the main reports at the congress, suggesting that Moscow does not expect changes in the leadership at this level, at least in the intervening period.

[REDACTED]

* * * *

Egypt-USSR: Nasir's discussions in Moscow with the Soviet leaders have been extended again, suggesting that some differences have arisen, probably related, at least in part, to the recent US diplomatic initiative. Full-scale meetings between Nasir and Soviet leaders were scheduled to conclude on 11 July, but another session has now been tentatively set for tomorrow. Foreign Ministers Riad and Gromyko met on 12 July in an unusual Sunday session, and Cairo press reports indicate that both political and military discussions at the ministerial level will be resumed. Egypt's semi-official newspaper al-Ahram has reported that senior Egyptian officials will stay in Moscow with Nasir until his return to Cairo early next week.

[REDACTED]

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25X1 Laos: The Communists appear to be moving ahead with a fresh diplomatic initiative. Prime Minister Souvanna has been informed that Communist leader Souphanouvong is sending a representative to Vientiane to "examine the arrangements" for an "eventual meeting" between the "interested parties." The Communist representative will carry a letter from Souphanouvong, evidently in response to Souvanna's letter of late June proposing that talks be held in Communist territory in Laos. The Lao Communist initiative comes hard on the heels of evidence that consultations involving the Soviets and the Polish International Control Commission representatives had been taking place in Hanoi in early July. [REDACTED]

* * * *

25X1 Communist China - Tanzania - Zambia: The three countries have signed a protocol calling for Peking to provide slightly more than \$400 million in credit for the Tan-Zam railway, thereby clearing the way for the start of construction. This is the largest economic credit ever extended by China and is provided on very generous terms--interest free payment to be spread over 30 years with a five-year grace period. A second protocol approved the survey and design of the railway. The number of Chinese technicians that will be granted entry into the two African countries still may not have been determined--between 1,500 and 2,000 are estimated to be there now. [REDACTED]

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
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Chile-Cuba: Chilean officials' current talks with a visiting Cuban trade delegation probably will lead to additional sales of Chilean agricultural products to Cuba, now set at \$11 million for 1970-71. In addition, [redacted]

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[redacted] the first Cuban sales under the renewed commerce will be 6,500 tons of sugar, to be sold to a leftist politician who is already shipping wine to Havana. Although it sanctions the trade, the Frei government is not trying to make much political mileage with the left by playing up the Cuban visit. The government seems to be ignoring the fact that restoring trade with Cuba adds a measure of respectability to Marxist presidential candidate Salvador Allende, an active and longtime Castro supporter. [redacted]

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
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Congo (B) - Congo (K): Brazzaville and Kinshasa have taken a cautious first step toward implementing the recently signed "Manifesto of Reconciliation" by agreeing to resume weekly ferry traffic between the two capitals beginning 16 July. Given the depth of mutual suspicion, however, little progress is likely to be made for some time in fulfilling key provisions of the manifesto, which calls for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties and full commercial and communications links. Moreover, neither government is likely to comply fully with the manifesto's requirement that each provide a list of resident subversives from the other country.

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